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Abstract 
This paper analyzes the career backgrounds of local government officials in provincial Envi-
ronmental Protection Bureaus (EPBs) in China and explains appointment processes of Chi-
nese EPB bureaucrats. Using biographical information of provincial EPB heads and drawing 
on extensive fieldwork conducted in 2010 in Shanxi Province and Inner Mongolia, this paper 
finds that only one-fourth of current EPB heads were promoted through the bureau ranks 
within the EPB, while the remaining three-fourths were appointed from positions outside the 
environment field. Further, nearly all EPB heads’ professional backgrounds and associated 
networks can be clearly categorized as environmental, business, provincial government, or 
local government oriented. The paper delineates these four types of Chinese EPB leaders and 
explains why an awareness of the different professional orientations is critical to understand-
ing  environmental protection in China. These findings have implications for inferring the 
unique characteristics of a province’s EPB leadership, the implementation capacities of pro-
vincial EPBs, and the appointment preferences of provincial leaders. 
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1  Introduction 
 
Previous research on China has focused on the institutional limitations of local Environmental 
Protection Bureaus (EPBs). These include studies in Guangdong (Lo & Tang, 2006; Sinkule 
& Ortolano, 1995), Shandong (Ma, 2000), Sichuan (van Rooij, 2003), and Liaoning (Bauer, 
2006). It seems uniformly acknowledged that EPBs are often understaffed, underfunded, and 
lacking in the necessary formal power to implement many environmental tasks assigned them. 
What is implicit in these studies is that if these EPBs were granted the institutional capacity to 
function efficiently and authoritatively in their localities, then EPBs would be much more 
likely to achieve their environmental protection objectives. 
 
This  paper  evaluates  the  implementation  capacity  of  EPBs  through  an  alternative  ap-
proach. It evaluates institutional capacity by analyzing the backgrounds of current provincial 
EPB heads and explains why some EPB heads are selected over others.
1 The EPB heads are 
often authoritative figures within the bureaus and have an overriding influence over the inter-
nal workings of bureaus’ environmental protection efforts (van Rooij, 2003). However, the 
EPB heads are themselves only one small part of an intricate network of government agen-
cies, which rely on inter-departmental coordination and consensus building to achieve their 
bureau objectives (Sinkule and Ortolano, 1995). Bureau heads are promoted into their posi-
tions by provincial leaders and obey the explicit orders and implicit priorities of these leaders. 
As EPB heads are authoritative and influential figures within an EPB (van Rooij, 2003; Bauer, 
2006), the institutional capacities, relative to each other, of provincial EPBs can be to a large 
extent determined by the priorities and objectives of the current EPB heads. The overall ca-
pacities, or willingness, of the EPB heads to undertake strict environmental protection meas-
ures are heavily influenced by their relations to their superiors in the provincial government 
and their colleagues in other bureaus. 
 
While previous research has analyzed leaders’ backgrounds, they mainly study national 
and provincial level leaders, which include provincial party secretaries and mayors (Li, 2000; 
Huang, 2002; Mei, 2009). Very little of this literature depicts provincial bureau heads as ac-
tive agents. This article aims to fill this gap, providing insight into career trajectories and bio-
graphical data and the possible implications of these factors on environmental protection per-
formance. Who are these departmental heads and what light can their backgrounds shed on 
the workings and capacities of provincial EPBs? Do they share similar demographic charac-
teristics and professional experiences across China? Specifically, an analysis of EPBs' bio-
graphical information helps to achieve three important objectives: 1) reveal the career patterns 
of provinces’ leading bureaucrats in charge of environmental policy implementation; 2) ex-
hibit the professional networks of these bureaucrats; and 3) assess how career backgrounds 
and professional networks influence the implementation capacity and independence of local 
EPBs. 
 
The analysis of EPB departmental heads’ career patterns and institutional backgrounds 
highlights the variety of non-environmental career backgrounds, concurrent affiliations and 
professional networks and argues that EPB leaders are highly embedded in the local govern-
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implementation capacity of EPB leaders, it can also dilute environmental protection incen-
tives. This implies that there is a delicate balance between professional networks which im-
prove implementation capacity and relations which paralyze efforts to improve environmental 
protection in China. The study further shows that EPB leaders may be easily categorized by 
their career backgrounds. The distinct characteristics of these ‘types’ suggest that provincial 
leaders make important appointment decisions among clearly differentiated candidates. This 
may have implications for inferring appointment preferences of provincial leaders. The most 
desirable candidate for the EPB head position will likely be an official whose assumed net-
works and incentives will be favorably aligned with provincial interests and with parochial 
interests of the provincial leaders. Appointing provincial leaders are more likely to opt for an 
EPB head with the strength to help them to meet their individual mandatory or ‘hard’ (ying 
xing 硬性) targets under the cadre responsibility system, amongst which provincial leaders 
identified some targets that are more difficult to meet than others. Thus, provincial leaders 
selecting the most able EPB head may not behave altruistically, but, ultimately, in their self-
interest.   
 
The analysis draws from biographical information of provincial departmental heads and 
interviews undertaken during 2010. Biographical data were collected for 124 departmental 
heads of the provincial Environmental Protection Bureau (EPB), Development and Reform 
Commission (DRCs), Economic Commission (ECs), and Construction Bureau (CBs) in Chi-
na’s 31 provinces. The paper focuses on the career trajectories of the 31 departmental heads 
of the EPB, the government bureau predominately in charge of environmental protection.
2 
The  author  collected  official  biographies  of  departmental  heads  published  on  government 
websites and took note of leaders’ demographic characteristics (e.g., age, education, birth 
place, gender) and the different current and prior work positions held, including location, start 
year and end year, and position. Afterwards, coding was used to classify professional affilia-
tions, concurrent positions, and area of previous work experiences. One limitation of this 
study is that the analysis only looks at reported professional affiliations and links, which dif-
fer from the full extent of actual links because they do not reflect intertwined informal con-
nections, In addition, some salient information might be oversimplified, misreported (e.g., 
educational training), or not publically available. Despite this shortcoming, to the authors’ 
knowledge, this is the first bibliographic database tracking the careers of departmental heads. 
Where information was not available on government websites or to clarify some inconsisten-
cies, additional information was sought in newspaper articles, government documents, online 
reports, or the baidu online encyclopedia.
3 The analysis also draws on 71 semi-structured in-
terviews conducted in Shanxi and Inner Mongolia during June and October of 2010. Inter-
views with EPB government officials provided an understanding of the overall institutional 
capacities to complete the implementation tasks and responsibilities assigned to EPBs. Field 
research in Shanxi Province also offered the opportunity to interview the EPB head personally 
to analyze his career background and networks. 
 
The next section introduces concepts and arguments relevant to understanding the career 
patterns of provincial leading bureaucrats in charge of environmental policy implementation. 
The paper then analyzes previous work experiences, concurrent affiliations, and professional 
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in their locality. The paper concludes by highlighting possible implications of EPB heads’ 
policy orientation and by pointing out possible implications for environmental protection im-
plementation. 
 
2  Previous Literature and the Assumptions of this Study 
This research is based upon a number of assumptions from previous research on the cadre 
management system and environmental politics in China. Namely, the assumptions are: (a) 
environmental  protection  law  enforcement  and  policy  implementation  is  flexible  and  thus 
there is room for agency to shape policy outcomes; (b) the EPB head is an authoritative and 
personally influential figure within the provincial EPB; (c) provincial EPBs operate under the 
local People’s Government and the Communist Party Committee and alongside other bureaus, 
which requires coordination and consensus building between these various bodies; and (d) 
career paths and institutional backgrounds determine the professional skills, networks, fac-
tional ties, and incentives of government leaders and bureaucrats. The literature for these as-
sumptions is outlined below. In the following sections, these assumptions are used to address 
the questions of: (1) what specific work experiences, networks, factional ties, and incentives 
do Chinese EPB heads have? and (2) how do the experiences, networks, ties, and incentives 
of EPB heads influence the implementation capacity and independence of local EPBs? 
 
(a) Flexible Environmental Law Enforcement and Policy Implementation 
 
Most China observers are well aware of the gap between national level environmental laws 
and policies and their implementation at the local level. There is a large body of literature on 
the specific topic of flexibility in environmental protection in China to support this. For ex-
ample, a number of studies highlight the existence of ‘local protectionism’ in China and argue 
that local governments place priority on protecting their economic interests instead of the en-
vironment (for an excellent literature summary, see van Rooji 2006, pp. 61-65). While there 
has  been  recent  progress  in  creating  improved  national  environmental  legislation  ((Xie, 
2004a: 13, 2004b: 8) and increasing prioritization of environmental protection work (Wang, 
1997: 23; Xie, 2004b: 8) aimed at ameliorating the effects of such protectionism, these prob-
lems continue to exist. Some argue that this is because national laws may lack local legiti-
macy (Bardach and Kagan, 1982; van Rooij 2006). Also, bureau leaders have long had sub-
stantial discretionary power in how they choose to punish violations of national laws (Davis, 
1969) and this still holds true for environmental law. Environmental protection decisions lack 
internal and external checks and balances (van Rooij, 2003) and therefore EPB heads may 
maintain a large degree of control over the efficacy, or inefficacy, of their bureaus. 
 
(b) Authority and Personal Influence of an EPB Head 
 
Previous studies emphasize the importance of individual leadership at the provincial, munici-
pal or county level. Studying the Sichuan provincial EPB, van Rooij’s findings stress that "the 
EPB is a centralist institution, and that its leadership has a final (direct and/or indirect) influ-
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Another field study in Liaoning attributes major environmental improvements in Benxi mu-
nicipality to the interventions of a high profile and charismatic municipal EPB head who 
“contrasted sharply with former EPB Heads in Benxi, who had held little power” (Bauer, 
2006: 37). Benxi’s powerful EPB head even managed to capture the attention of national 
leaders, which laid the path for a major local pollution reduction program (Bauer, 2006: 39). 
These research findings allow us to characterize an EPB head as authoritative and influential 
within the EPB structure. 
 
(c) Bureau Interdependence and People’s Government and Communist Party Committee Au-
thority  
 
The EPBs are dependent on the provincial government partly because the provincial govern-
ment has the authority to appoint the head of the provincial EPB. Thus, the provincial gov-
ernment, “through its direct and indirect influence on personnel decision making, has a firm 
grip on the EPB" (Van Rooji, 2003: 46). This matters because, for provincial leaders, envi-
ronmental protection is only one target alongside economic growth, employment, and social 
targets and leaders are likely to appoint a provincial EPB with views or background who can 
advance the province’s overall development plan. Provincial governments might more often 
appoint EPB leaders with a non-EPB background in order to strengthen EPBs’ linkage and 
ties to other bureaus or to ensure that provincial economic interests are not sacrificed.  
 
In addition to appointment control, there is also fiscal and administrative dependence be-
tween the EPB and other government agencies. For EPBs to carry out their daily work and 
objectives, leading officials depend on support from other departmental heads and provincial 
leaders as well as city mayors. EPBs receive funding for staff and projects from the provin-
cial/municipal government and EPB budgets are thus subject to approval from the provin-
cial/municipal finance bureau (Bauer, 2006; Lo & Tang, 2006). Many EPBs therefore need to 
actively cultivate cooperative relationships and coordinate with other key departments.
 Sin-
kule and Ortolano’s study shows how the Shenzhen EPB employed both formal and informal 
means to link with other departments. One such formal tactic used by the EPB, used only in 
extreme circumstances, is direct appeal to the city mayor to settle a conflict between itself and 
another department. More commonly-used tactics are informal  and consist of negotiation, 
bargaining, and consensus-building in order to influence other departments’ actions (Sinkule 
& Ortolano, 1995: 153).  
 
(d) Appointment Decisions, Career Paths, Networks, Incentives 
 
In addition to developing cooperative relationships with other departments and becoming lo-
cally embedded, awareness of underlying professional networks is also crucial for understand-
ing EPB’s work and implementation capacity. A good starting point is to analyze current EPB 
heads’ prior career paths and work experience. Previous work has examined the career paths 
of leading government officials and tried to detect patterns in appointment and promotion 
decisions (Burns, 1987, 1994; Walder, 1995; Manion, 1985, 1993). In China, formal cadre 
evaluation criteria include qualification requirements, such as age, education, experience, as 
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political standpoint and moral character. In these performance evaluations, cadre evaluation 
criteria such as ‘Both Redness and Expertness’ (youhong youzhuan又红又专) or ‘Both Integ-
rity and Competence’ (decai jianbei德才兼备) are often purposely left vague and are hard to 
match with operationalizable standards (Mei 2009). This vagueness leaves ample room for 
selectors to define what characteristics of a candidate are desirable and which ‘merits’ are 
conducive  for  the  organizational  good  (Tullock,  1965).  Appointment  procedures  are  thus 
shaped by selectors’ preferences and career incentives. A leading cadre is selected by one or a 
group of government officials from the upper-level government and which candidate gets 
picked sheds light on the ‘selector’ side (Mei 2009). 
 
Li’s (2010) empirical analysis of the provincial secretaries and mayors reveals that career 
promotions based on family ties (largely the domain of princeling, known as taizi太子) or on 
patron-client relations (personal assistants, known as mishu秘书) continue to be prevalent in 
China. Other studies have emphasized the importance of factional ties in Chinese politics 
formed on the basis of being born in the same province (tongxiang 同乡), attending the same 
school (tongxue 同学) and sharing common work experience (tongshi 同事), with the latter 
being the focus of this study (see for example, Li, 1994; Pye, 1995; Shih 2008; Hillman, 
2010; Shih, Shan and Liu, 2010). The networks of an EPB head from previous work experi-
ence may shape his or her incentives and policy preference. Leaders’ local networks and rela-
tionships likely improve the implementation capacity of EPBs, but also at times weaken in-
centives to strictly enforce environmental protection laws and policies.  
The next section turns to analysis of the bibliographic data and professional history of 
China’s 31 provincial EPB leaders currently holding office (as of February 2011) and shows 
what kinds of professional networks and links EPB Heads hold.  
 
3  Biographical Characteristics of Current EPB Heads 
As discussed, EPB heads, to large extent, determine the relative capacity and roles of local 
EPBs. Given EPB heads’ low rank compared to the local government leaders and other bu-
reau heads, an EPB head’s preferences and leadership capacity are determined largely by the 
quality of their relations to other actors in the locality. In addition, EPB leaders’ capacity is 
determined by the EPB heads’ previous work experiences. Because the relationships and work 
experiences of EPB heads are strongly determined by career path, this section analyzes the 
biographical information of China’s thirty-one EPB heads. It addresses the question: (1) what 
specific work experiences, networks, factional ties, and incentives do Chinese EPB heads 
have? 
 
Basic Characteristics  
Although basic characteristics did not correlate with other factors such as time in office or 
career background in statistical analysis, they are provided here as background information on 
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or Party Secretary are male. In addition, the vast majority are ethnically Han and between the 
ages of 46 and 60. Most EPB heads from ethnic minorities are the heads of EPBs in minority 
autonomous regions, and the two EPB heads under the age of 46 head the EPB in Tibet and 
Beijing. The Tibet EPB head is the youngest, at 41. The average age is 51.6 years old. As 
shown in Table 1, nearly all EPB heads are nearing retirement, which is mandatory at the age 
of 60 in China, and are likely to have developed large professional networks over their ca-
reers. 
 
From Table 1, we see that most EPB heads claimed to have 4 year college degrees or 
higher, and several held PhD degrees. As is often the case for Chinese bureaucrats, many of 
the EPB heads received degrees or professional training while in the civil service. Their aca-
demic fields are diverse but the majority of EPB leaders studied engineering, economics, and 
management. Only three leaders have degrees with majors in environmental sciences (EPB 
head in Tibet) or law (EPB heads in Guizhou and Sichuan). 
 
Table 1: Basic Characteristics and Educational Backgrounds of EPB Heads 
    EPB  Heads  (Num-
ber) 
Percentages (%) 
Gender  Male  31  100 
  Female  0  0 
Ethnicity  Han  21  84 
  Minority  4  16 
  Information not available  7  - 
Age Range*  56–60   7  23 
  51–55   11  35 
  46–50   11  35 
  41–45   2  6 
  Total  31  100 
Educational   Ph.D.  5  18 
Level  Master’s Degree  12  43 
  4-Year College  9  32 
  2-Year College  2  7 
  Total  28  100 
  Information not available  3   
Academic   Environment  1  4 
Majors  Economics /Management  9**  32 
  Politics/Public  Adminstrati-
on 
2  7 
  Engineering  9  32 
  Law  2  7 
  Chinese   3  11 
  Others  2  7 
  Total  28  100 
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Notes: *Average age of EPB heads is 51.6 years. ** Includes two EPB leaders with degrees in 
engineering and management. 
 
 
Figure 1 shows the ages of EPB heads at the time of their appointments to their current 
positions. The average age of appointment for current EPB heads is 47.6. EPB heads of prov-
ince-level municipalities Beijing, Shanghai, and Chongqing were appointed to their positions 
at the age of 45 or younger. The EPB head in province-level municipality Tianjin entered of-
fice at the age of 46. Of the non-municipal provincial EPB heads appointed at the age of 45 or 
younger, two serve in central provinces (Hubei and Hunan), four in western provinces (Ning-
xia, Gansu, Xinjiang, Tibet), of which three are autonomous regions (Gansu, Xinjiang, Tibet), 
and one in a coastal province, Shandong.  The average time served in the current position as 
EPB head is 4.0 years. EPB heads who have served in their positions for longer than five 
years  are  the  heads  of  EPBs  in  Hebei,  Shaanxi,  Guangdong,  Hunan,  Yunnan,  Tibet,  and 
Chongqing. The longest-serving head is the EPB head in Beijing, who took office in July, 
2002. Heads of EPBs in Hebei, Shaanxi, Guangdong, Hunan, and Tibet were all appointed in 
2003, at the beginning of the Hu-Wen administration.  
 
 




Notes: *Average age of appointment: 47.6 years old. **Average time in current position as 





Career Paths and Institutional Backgrounds 
This section summarizes the previous positions and career backgrounds of EPB heads, respec-
tively. Table 2 lists the positions the current EPB heads held immediately prior to their ap-
pointments. From this table, we see that only 8 EPB heads were promoted within the EPB, 
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one-third of the current EPB heads were appointed from municipal level positions such as 




Table 2: Position before Appointment to the EPB Head 




Promoted within the EPB  8  26 
Appointed from another provincial department  7  23 
Economic  3/7   
Other  4/7   
Appointed from the provincial People’s Govt/Party Committee  4  13 
Appointed  from  municipal  mayor  (deputy)/party  secretary 
(vice) 
10  32 
Appointed from a state-owned enterprise  1  3 
Appointed from county level Party Secretary  1  3 




However, there is a discrepancy between the number of EPB heads promoted from municipal 
positions and the number of EPB heads who spent the largest portion of their careers at the 
county or municipal. Although ten of the current EPB heads were appointed from municipal 
level positions (Table 2), Table 3 shows that only five of the current EPB heads spent the ma-
jority of their careers in lower level governments. This is because many government officials 
from province level departments were appointed to serve as municipal level leaders for three 
to five years before returning to the provincial level as EPB head. For example, four of eight 
EPB heads with economic department careers were rotated through provincial government or 
municipal leadership positions before being appointed EPB head. 
 
Table 3 categorizes the career backgrounds of EPB heads. In Table 3, the EPB heads were 
coded according to the government level or type of bureau in which they spent the largest 
portion of their careers. Most EPB heads spent from ten to twenty years in these career tracks. 
From the table, we see that 16 EPB heads (52 percent) spent most of their career at the pro-
vincial level, 7 within the EPB (23 percent), 5 in lower level governments (16 percent), and 2 
with a state-owned enterprise (SOE) (6 percent). The majority of EPB heads built their careers 
in political positions at the provincial governments or Party Committees (3 heads), provincial 
non-economic departments (6 heads), or municipal governments (5 heads). Next to long po-
litical careers, many EPB heads spent their careers in economic or business positions, either in 
an economic bureau career (8 heads) or in an enterprise career (2 heads, Jiangxi and Gansu). 
 
EPB leaders who rose through the environmental protection bureau ordinarily began as 
environmental protection researchers or pollution control specialists. They  were promoted 
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provincial economic bureaus started as cadres in provincial economic bureaus and were ro-
tated among the different provincial government economic agencies. EPB heads who origi-
nated from municipal governments spent nearly all of their careers in a single locality, gradu-
ally climbing the bureaucratic ladder. EPB heads with careers in non-economic bureaus ordi-
narily spent the majority of their careers rising through the ranks in a single bureau before 
eventually being rotated through leadership positions in other provincial non-economic bu-
reaus. Two of three leaders who worked in provincial governments or Party committees were 
promoted through the Communist Youth League system. There  are two SOE career EPB 
heads who began as workers in industrial enterprises and worked their way up to upper man-
agement positions in a SOE before being appointed to positions in the government late in 
their careers. 
 
Three out of the 31 EPB heads are not easily categorized because their careers did not fol-
low a ‘standard’ career path of promotions within municipal governments, the Communist 
Youth League, specific provincial non-economic bureaus, provincial economic bureaus, or 
SOEs. These are the EPB heads in Jiangsu, Anhui, and Tibet. The Jiangsu EPB head held, for 
six years, the position as a vice secretary (mishu 副秘书) in the provincial government, but 
served the majority of his earlier career in different economic government bureaus.
 4  He was 
categorized as ‘economic’. In Anhui, the current head of the provincial EPB spent a nearly 
equal amount of time, over ten years each, in both provincial economic departments and in 
lower level government positions, but spent slightly more time in provincial economic de-
partments. He was also categorized as ‘economic’. Another notable exception to the patterns 
of local political or economic careers is the Tibet EPB head who began his career as a re-
searcher and aid worker in the environmental field before joining the civil service as the Dep-
uty Head of the Tibet EPB.
5  His career background was categorized as ‘EPB’. 
 
Table 3: Career Background 





Career Backgrounds*     
  EPB  7  23 
  Provincial level  16  52 









  Municipal level  5  16 
  Enterprise  2  6 
  Total  31  100 
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Interestingly, EPB leaders with environmental and other non-economic backgrounds are 
most commonly appointed to urban municipalities. All four province-level municipal gov-
ernments appointed EPB leaders with careers in environmental protection or non-economic 
bureaus such as labor and social security, urban planning, or construction.  
Table 4 analyzes EPB heads’ previous work experience in state-owned enterprises. 19% 
of all EPB heads (or 6 out of 31) worked at some point for an SOE. Three EPB heads worked 
for enterprises in heavy industry (iron and steel, metallurgy, and chemicals), which could be 
especially  useful  work  experience  for  an  EPB  head.  For  example,  the  Jiangxi  EPB  head 
worked his entire career in a provincial chemicals SOE, beginning as a factory assistant and 
eventually rising to chairman of the board. The Gansu EPB head also spent the majority of his 
career in an enterprise, rising from technician to deputy CEO. SOE work experience also ex-
posed EPB leaders to the general aspects of enterprise management. For example, the EPB 
head in Zhejiang worked for several years as deputy head of propaganda in an SOE and the 
Shanxi EPB head was briefly a building general manager in the late 80s. 
 
 
Table 4: EPB Head Enterprise Experience 




EPB Leaders with Enterprise Experience*                      
  Yes  6  19 
   No  25  81 
  Total  31  100 
EPB Leader  Areas of Industrial Experience 
  Hubei  Iron and steel 
  Zhejiang  Metallurgy 
  Sichuan  Import/export 
                         Shanxi    Building management 
  Jiangxi  Chemicals 
  Shanghai  Construction  and  resource  development 
(affiliation) 
Note: *Refers to temporary placements, concurrent affiliations, previous jobs, or rotating po-
sitions, mostly in state-owned enterprises. 
 
 
Concurrent Affiliations and Cross-Postings 
Of the thirty-one provincial EPB profiles analyzed here, six EPB heads list outside affiliations 
on their CVs including one EPB head who also lists a cross-posting (Table 5). Three EPB 
heads hold National People’s Congress (NPC) delegate positions (Sichuan, Shanghai, Anhui), 
which are very prestigious titles, and two EPB heads hold Provincial People’s Congress dele-
gate positions (Guizhou, Hebei). One EPB Head is cross-posted as the Head of the Nuclear 
Safety Management Bureau (Sichuan). Two EPB heads have affiliations with local universi-
ties, one as a PhD adviser (Shandong) and another as a professor (Hunan). The number of 
affiliations of EPB heads is likely to be understated. For example, it is common for a bureau 
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their short bios published online. In addition, EPB heads may not publicly reveal their affilia-
tions with local enterprises to avoid the appearance of bias. 
 
 
Table 5: Concurrent Affiliations and Cross-Postings* 




Affiliation to National People’s Congress (NPC)  3  10 
Affiliation to Provincial People’s Congress (PPC)  2  6 
Affiliation to university  2  6 
Cross-postings  1  3 
No affiliation reported**  25  81 
Total  31  100 
Note: * Listed affiliations only refer to reported affiliations on government websites. **There 
are six EPB heads with concurrent affiliations or cross-postings because two EPB heads had 
more than one concurrent affiliation or cross-posting. 
 
 
4  How to Interpret Previous Work Experiences and Career Backgrounds 
 
This section addresses the question: how do the experiences, networks, ties, and incentives of 
EPB heads influence the implementation capacity and independence of provincial EPBs? As 
the guanxi and factional ties of an EPB head from his or her previous work experience may 
shape the incentives of EPB heads, these links and networks can be used to assign ‘types’ to 
each of the provincial EPB heads. Each type can be inferred to come with a possible orienta-
tion or slant towards the interests of the type’s corresponding networks and factional ties. This 
orientation will not necessarily hold for each leader, especially in cases where provincial lead-
ers commit an usually high degree of personal attention to environmental protection such as in 
Shanxi Province, for example, which has garnered widespread media attention from environ-
mental scandals and overall degradation.
6 While EPB head’s biography and professional net-
works may not wholly determine his policy preferences, it is plausible to assume that these 
factors have a strong impact.   
 
As previously stated, these ‘types’ are based on the career backgrounds of EPB heads, 
most of whom spent the majority of their careers working in a particular area. Table 3 in the 
previous section categorized EPB heads by the institutions in which they spent the majority of 
their careers. From this table, it is clear that most EPB heads fall into one of four career back-
ground categories, and are nearly evenly split among them: careers in environmental protec-
tion bureaus; in provincial governments, Party committees, or non-economic provincial bu-
reaus; in local governments as municipal mayors or party secretaries; or in economic bureaus 
or state-owned enterprises. Here these career backgrounds are assigned the following types: 
‘environmentally-oriented’ for career EPB bureaucrats; ‘provincially-oriented’ for those bu-





Frankfurt School of Finance & Management 
Working Paper No. 174  15 
 
non-economic provincial bureaus; ‘locally-oriented’ for bureaucrats with careers in local gov-
ernment; and ‘business-oriented’ for career economic bureaucrats and SOE managers. Figure 












Notes:  *  Categorization  based  on  analysis  of  three  previous  work  experiences.  Policy-
setting/provincially-oriented category combines leaders with government and non-economic 
provincial bureau careers. The business-oriented category combines leaders with careers in 
provincial economic bureaus and enterprises. 
 
 
If existing networks based on career backgrounds influence EPB implementation capaci-
ties and priorities, then the selection of a provincial EPB head with a certain background can 
have a significant impact on local environmental protection. Since EPB heads can be rela-
tively easily categorized by their work backgrounds (28 out of 31 of the EPB heads spent the 
majority of their time on a particular career path), provincial leaders seem to prefer particular 
types of political or economic embedded leaders when considering bureaucrats for promotion 
to EPB head. In the appointment process, provincial leaders can be expected to weigh the 
benefits of EPH head candidates’ professional networks, factional ties, skills, and incentives. 
Although this analysis does not take into consideration ‘soft’ factors obtained through per-
sonal interactions, informal reports, candidate interviews, factional ties and other kinds of 
guanxi commitments, these backgrounds nonetheless convey a great deal of information on 
the professional networks, skills, and orientations of EPB heads. Given limited available in-
formation on the candidates under consideration, provincial leaders will likely consider a can-
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filiations, and previous performance evaluations as an indicator for their preferences and prac-
tices. Career paths can also convey a great deal of information to the appointing officials on 
the candidate’s professional networks, factional ties, skills, and incentives. As argued below, 
the ‘best’ candidate may not, in all cases, be the person with the best ability and credentials 
but rather the person who best supports the political position of the appointer. The following 
section introduces the characteristics of these EPB head orientation categories and explains 
how each category of backgrounds may influence EPB implementation capacities and priori-
ties in different ways. 
     
Environmentally-oriented EPB Heads  
Environmentally-oriented leaders are departmental heads who were promoted entirely within 
the EPB structure. Leaders belonging to this category have developed ties to other local EPBs 
and actors closely linked to EPB-related work. Over the years, these government officials 
have accumulated in-depth environmental knowledge and expertise at the sub-provincial and 
provincial levels. Their technical and environmental expertise combined with an awareness of 
local implementation practices may make them effective leaders in tackling difficult environ-
mental challenges, but only if they are given sufficient support from the provincial govern-
ment and other bureaus. Having worked the majority of their careers as environmental spe-
cialists drafting or carrying out national and provincial environmental regulations, these lead-
ers are likely to have large networks in the environmental protection field yet lack extensive 
connections to other non-environmental actors. This relative lack of networks beyond the EPB 
may hinder their ability to capitalize on their specialized knowledge on environmental protec-
tion methods as they may be less effective in establishing and coordinating working relations 
with other departments. 
 
Provincially-oriented EPB Heads 
Provincially-oriented EPB heads spent the majority of their careers at the Provincial People’s 
Government or Party offices or in non-economic bureaus such as urban planning, construc-
tion, or labor and social security. The interests of these provincially-oriented EPB leaders are 
likely to be aligned with the province’s policy-making level. Their behaviors will be the most 
in keeping with the policy objectives and priorities of the provincial government and Party 
committee because of previous work experience which provides the networks and factional 
ties to the province. In contrast to environmentally-oriented cadres, provincially-oriented EPB 
heads with career backgrounds at the provincial level are more likely to have a wider range of 
networks with other provincial departments. Bureaucrats from the provincial government or 
Party committee will have overseen the work of many provincial bureaus. Non-economic bu-
reau leaders are regularly rotated among provincial level bureaus once they have reached the 
peak of their careers, and often have accrued a great deal of inter-bureau work experience by 
the time they are appointed EPB head.  
 
  However, leaders in this group who spent nearly their entire career at the provincial level 
may have limited awareness of local implementation difficulties and practical concerns. Also, 
leaders with provincially-oriented careers in non-economic bureaus may lack strong networks 
to economic bureaus or enterprises. They may, thus, have less practical knowledge of busi-
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overall welfare benefit to the provincial government such as tax revenue. From a professional 
skills angle, on the other hand, certain non-economic bureau heads may have increased im-
plementation capacity because they share some characteristics with environmentally-oriented 
leaders. Given their backgrounds in urban planning, constructions, and labour, leaders in this 
category could effectively help provincial leaders to meet particular cadre targets. For exam-
ple, an EPB leader with a bureau background in construction or urban planning is likely to be 
especially adept in enforcing national guidelines and devising provincial standards to lower 
energy usage in the local construction industry or addressing rising pollution in large urban-
ized cities. Yet, this may be very dependent on the level of provincial support for these poli-
cies. 
      
Locally-oriented EPB Heads 
Locally-oriented leaders refer to departmental heads that spent the majority of their career at 
county and municipal-level governments and agencies. Many officials in this cohort of EPB 
leaders worked most of their career in one or two localities before being promoted to the post 
of provincial EPB head. They are likely to retain tight links to their home localities. These ties 
likely provide a platform for informal feedback, which may improve provincial implementa-
tion  polices.  Of  course,  cosy  relationships  might  also  result  in  favoritism  and  exception-
granting. Lacking necessary networks and influence at the provincial level, locally-oriented 
leaders might also be less effective in gaining buy-ins from other provincial players and en-
terprises. 
 
Beyond these networks considerations, during their many years spent at the local level, 
these leaders likely develop a political sense of how to balance competing priorities in the 
policy implementation process. This is particularly relevant to environmental protection. The 
ambitious approach to environmental protection in national and provincial policies and the 
pragmatic economic and social concerns of government agents and business interests at the 
local level make implementation of these policies especially contentious. Awareness of local 
implementation practices and knowledge about existing policy loopholes gives these leaders 
an advantage when enforcing environmental mandates that are highly dependent on municipal 
support.  
 
Business-oriented EPB Heads 
Finally, the EPB leaders categorized as business-oriented have worked previously in provin-
cial economic bureaus or state-owned enterprises. An economic bureau background ensures 
that a leader is well situated in the provincial policy-setting, while an enterprise background 
signals familiarity with implementation practices at the enterprise level. The business-oriented 
‘type’ can draw on wide range of economic and business-related contacts in forming business-
government alliances or breaking down enterprise opposition to stringent regulations. Exist-
ing networks to other economic bureaus and enterprises likely extends the reach of the EPB, 
thus possibly strengthening it. However, highly business-oriented leaders might also sacrifice 
strictly enforcing environmental protection laws and policies in favor of provincial economic 
growth or individual business interests. For example, while working in a SOE, an EPB leader 
might have inherited business contacts, potentially giving rise to a conflict of interest. Also, 
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contacts with other enterprises. Having worked predominantly at the provincial level on eco-
nomic issues, leaders in this category may also lack expertise in environmental matters and 
local implementation enforcement. 
 
In summary, there are different types of EPB heads based on their integration into provin-
cial politics (policy-level vs local level) and existing networks based on career backgrounds 
(generalist vs specialized networks).
7 Delineating different types of EPB leaders helps to un-
derstand provincial EPB leadership and the implementation capacities of provincial EPBs, 




5  Discussion: Appointment Decisions and Typology Preferences of Pro-
vincial Leaders 
The above documentation of the diversity of types among EPB heads is surprising. EPB lead-
ers’ career backgrounds may differ vastly, ranging from environmental bureaucrat, SOE busi-
ness manager, political strategist, to implementers. What can explain these differences among 
appointed EPB leaders? And begs the questions: What are provincial governments or Party 
leaders considering when appointing a local EPB head? Do appointment patterns tell us any-
thing about the needs of a province as perceived by the provincial government or Party? Or do 
they reflect leaders’ career and political incentives?  
 
A number of studies have highlighted the Chinese bureaucracy’s ability to select leaders 
in a rational manner (Burns, 1987, 1994; Huang, 2002; Manion, 1985; Walder, 1995). The 
findings of these studies indicate that the selection of bureau leaders is rarely random or hap-
hazard. Candidates are selected through a rigorous evaluation process which considers a wide 
number of factors, such as past work experience and performance. However, the ‘best’ candi-
date is not necessarily the candidate who will most thoroughly enforce environmental protec-
tion laws or even achieve the most progress in environmental protection.  
 
Provincial mayors and party secretaries, when appointing a provincial EPB head, consider 
both  overall  provincial  government’s  preferences  and  personal  incentives.  As  mentioned 
above, from the possible typologies, provincial leaders will need to select one ‘type’. The 
most desirable candidate for the EPB head position will likely be an official whose assumed 
networks and incentives assert to provincial leaders that under the new leadership EPB’s prac-
tices will be favorably aligned with provincial interests and with parochial interests of the 
provincial mayor and party secretary.
 8 The implications of these preferred backgrounds will 
be discussed in the rest of this section. 
 
Provincial Needs and Cadre’s Career Incentives 
When assessing bureaucrats for promotion to EPB head, provincial leaders will consider the 
overall provincial context and weight potential trade-offs, balancing considerations on the 
need for economic development, the complexity of environmental pollution issue, and re-
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ronmental needs, depending on the province’s level of economic development (rich/poor), the 
level and complexity of environmental pollution (high/low) and the required implementation 
(locally /provincially; coordinated/uncoordinated). Provinces may therefore seek out different 
types of environmental leadership. Local economic and environmental factors influence pro-
vincial leadership’s preference to pick a candidate who balances a certain mix of environ-
mental or business expertise, provincial or local networks, and high or low career ambition. 
These  factors  may  heavily  influence  the  capacity  of  an  EPB  head,  and  consequently 
strengthen or weaken the environmental protection institution itself.  
 
  In addition to considerations related to the overarching provincial interest, personal pref-
erences and career incentives of provincial Party secretaries and mayors are at least equally 
important, if not more so. A number of personal incentives may influence appointment deci-
sions, including potential of appointees to affect a leaders’ ability to meet targets, receive an-
nual bonuses, and be promoted, along with personal favoritism, but the most important of 
these is the desire for promotion. Rationally, cadres will evaluate candidates based on whether 
they help them to advance, or at least safeguard, their own careers.  
 
  For example, because mayors and party secretaries have signed individual cadre responsi-
bility contracts, outlining economic, social and political targets and goals necessary for their 
annual evaluation, candidates that will help them meet these goals, particularly those of  man-
datory or ‘hard’ (ying xing 硬性 ) targets, are likely to be found on the top of the candidate 
list. For environmental policy implementation, provincial leaders have clearly defined envi-
ronmental protection targets, some of which are ‘hard’ such as energy intensity reduction tar-
gets (Kostka and Hobbs, forthcoming). Amongst the many different targets, provincial leaders 
may have identified some that are more difficult to meet. If for example it is challenging to 
meet environmental hard targets, provincial leaders are more likely to opt for an EPB head 
with the strength to turn the wheel around. If in the individual contract meeting economic 
targets are harder, a business-oriented EPB leader might be more appropriate. If a particular 
problem is significant, leaders are likely to appoint an ambitious candidate who will go out of 
his way to ensure (hard) targets are met. This suggests that provincial leaders who select the 
most able EPB head may not be behaving altruistically, but, ultimately, self-interested. Ad-
justments  in  cadre  evaluation  criteria,  or  signals  from  Beijing  of  impending  adjustments, 
along with changes in career incentives and the overall political climate, further affect the 
EPB selection preferences. 
 
Examples of Candidate Selection and Selection Preferences  
Selecting a strong or weak candidate to address a particular provincial goal, assist provincial 
leaders’  in  addressing  political  concerns,  and  meet  evaluation  targets  can  be  illustrated 
through the example of Shanxi and Inner Mongolia. Shanxi faced increasing national and in-
ternational media coverage of high pollution in 2005 and 2006
9, which put pollution issues on 
the front burner for provincial leaders. In 2006, the provincial government picked a ‘strong’ 
and highly authoritative candidate with a large business-related network able to take drastic 
steps and deal with media pressure. The selected candidate, the current head of Shanxi Prov-
ince’s EPB, started his political career as the Deputy Secretary of the First Business Bureau in 
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Marketing Cooperative Council. Prior to joining the civil service, Shanxi’s EPB head was in 
the military and also worked as a television editor and journalist. He claimed to use the mili-
tary experience to get ‘respect’ from other leaders and environmental protection workers.
10 As 
for the media experience, within the Shanxi EPB, he was known for being particularly adept 
at handling media attention and obtaining media coverage for the province’s significant envi-
ronmental progress since his appointment in 2006.
11  Over the last five years, this ‘strong’ 
leader made substantial progress in reducing emissions, particularly SO2 emissions, and en-
forcing overall environmental protection standards, partly because he had a clear mandate 
from the provincial government following the National Development and Reform Commis-
sion’s introduction of hard targets in emissions reduction and energy savings for provincial 
leaders. 
 
While already highly developed provinces such as Shanxi may select a candidate with the 
ability and credentials to effectively implement environmental mandates, still developing re-
gions may appoint a candidate who can balance economic growth and environmental protec-
tion concern. Inner Mongolia, for instance, picked a candidate who lacked career incentives 
and large business-related or provincially-oriented networks that allow forming bridges be-
tween different government agencies. The current head of the Inner Mongolia EPB belongs to 
the Mongol ethnic minority, a contrast to the majority of departmental heads in Inner Mongo-
lia who are ethnically Han. He has a two year college degree in a non-environmental science 
field and was promoted to the office close to retirement at the age of 55, much later than the 
average appointment age of 47.6 years. Prior to appointment as the EPB head, he worked in 
the  Inner Mongolia Provincial Economic and Trade Commission and later as a mayor in 
Baotou Municipality, one of Inner Mongolia’s fastest-growing and resource-rich municipali-
ties. In contrast to the EPB head in Shanxi, he held no previous non-governmental work ex-
perience.Given his previous work experience on economic issues, he might be a candidate 
who gives way when pressured by the Inner Mongolian government to prioritize commercial 
interests  over  more  strict  environmental  enforcement.  Interviews  with  leading  officials  in 
charge of environmental protection in 2010 further confirmed that Inner Mongolia did not 




Moreover, in contrast to a somewhat prevalent government-enterprise coordination ap-
proach to policy implementation in provinces and autonomous regions, there is evidence that 
urban provincial-level municipal leaders prefer EPB candidates with environmental expertise 
or specialized networks to other non-economic bureaus, even while implementing these en-
ergy intensity and emissions reduction targets. All four province-level municipal governments 
appointed EPB leaders with careers in environmental protection or non-economic bureaus 
such as labor and social security, urban planning, or construction. In addition, EPB heads in 
all  four  province-level  municipalities  are  young,  with  leaders  in  Beijing,  Shanghai,  and 
Chongqing being appointed to their positions at the age of 45 or younger. Since younger EPB 
heads are likely to have smaller networks, and EPB heads with environmental protection or 
non-economic bureau backgrounds will have backgrounds which complement the EPBs work, 
it suggests that provincial-level municipal leaders prioritize environmental expertise and net-
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capacity of EPBs. Provincial-level municipal leaders may also prefer a relatively independent, 
professionally skilled EPB head.  
 
 
6  Conclusion 
This paper has examined career backgrounds and institutional backgrounds of local govern-
ment officials in provincial Environmental Protection Bureaus (EPBs) in China. EPB leaders’ 
career backgrounds differ vastly, ranging from environmental bureaucrat, SOE business man-
ager, political strategist, to implementers, despite EPB heads assuming seemingly similar en-
vironmental protection and law enforcement tasks. Based on their career backgrounds and 
their associated networks, EPB leaders fall into the following four typologies, and are nearly 
evenly  split  among  them:  environmentally-oriented,  business-oriented,  policy-
setting/provincially-oriented, and implementation/ locally-oriented EPB leaders. The analysis 
of EPB heads’ career backgrounds shows that only one fourth of provincial EPB heads were 
promoted within the EPB, while the remaining three-fourths came from positions outside the 
environment field. These findings have implications for inferring the unique characteristics of 
a province’s EPB leadership and the implementation capacities of provincial EPBs. 
 
The distinct characteristics of these different ‘types’ of EPB leaders show that provincial 
leaders make important appointment decisions among clearly differentiated candidates.
13 This 
may have implications for inferring appointment preferences of provincial leaders. Provincial 
mayors and party secretaries, when appointing EPB heads, balance different overall provincial 
and personal preferences. A certain candidate ‘type’ and career background might be more 
suitable to meet these different preferences. When assessing bureaucrats for promotion to 
EPB head, provincial leaders will consider the overall provincial context and weight potential 
trade-offs, balancing considerations on the need for economic development, the complexity of 
environmental pollution issue, and required implementation practices. Rationally, provincial 
leaders select an EPB head who will act in the best interest of the province as a whole as per-
ceived by these leaders, while also helping provincial leaders to bolster their own political 
careers.  
 
This paper further argued that a leaders’ local networks and relationships likely improves 
the implementation capacity of EPBs, but also at times weakens incentives to strictly enforce 
environmental protection laws and policies. This implies that there is a delicate balance be-
tween networks which improve implementation capacity and relations which might paralyze 
efforts to improve environmental protection in China. EPB heads that are well connected to 
other  key  departments  and  enterprises  are  more  likely  to  be  successful  in  creating  cross-
sectoral and cross-departmental coalitions. However, the professional networks which may 
improve environmental protection capacity in a province through coordination and consensus-
building also further decreases the already limited independence of local EPBs. Highly em-
bedded leaders have with limited independence and autonomy may place priority on commer-
cial, economic, or political interests over environmental protection, and turn a blind eye to 
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1 EPB ‘head’ refers to the EPB Director (juzhang ￿￿) or the EPB Party Secretary (dangzu shuji  ￿￿￿￿), 
which are positions almost always held concurrently. 
2 The main role of the EPB is to enforce environmental protection laws by regulating and monitoring pollution in 
water bodies, air, noise, solid waste, and soil. For a more detailed description of the role of EPBs, see Lee (2006: 
82).   
3 To ensure accuracy, information drawn from the baidu online enclyclopedia was checked against government 
documents and informal sources 
4 The Jiangsu EPB head spent his career as a low level bureaucrat (putong ganbu ￿￿￿￿, literally ‘ordinary 
cadre’) in a government economic service department (yewu bumen ￿￿￿￿) prior to being elected by provincial 
economic  leaders  as  deputy  director  of  a  comprehensive  economic  department  (jingji  zonghe  bumen 
￿￿￿￿￿￿), the provincial Economic and Trade Commission. This was nine years before being appointed to be 
the head of the Jiangsu Province EPB. In the nine years before his appointment as EPB head, he spent three in 
the Economic Commission and six as a vice secretary (fumishu ￿￿￿)) in the provincial government.  
5 The head of the EPB in Tibet, the youngest provincial EPB leader, began his government career (as deputy 
head of the Tibet EPB) only three years before being appointed the EPB head. He was 29 when he left Beijing to 
do aid work in Tibet in 1998 after spending most of his twenties studying for his PhD in environmental protec-
tion and after working briefly at the Beijing Environment Science Institute. 
6  See  for  example,  ‘Rivers  Run  Black  in  Shanxi  Province’,  China  Daily,  17  July  2006,  available  at 
http://www.china.org.cn/english/environment/174874.htm 
7 Generalist networks are those not limited to a particular issue area such as economics or environment, while the 
specialized networks are much more limited to these areas. The terminology of generalist and specialized net-
works is borrowed from Shih’s analysis of Chinese elite politics (2008). According to Shih, there are two types 
of factions: the ‘generalist’ and the ‘specialist/technocratic’. The generalist factions hold wide-ranging networks, 
both horizontally and vertically, while the specialist/technocratic factions are vertically concentrated within a 
bureaucratic system (xitong ￿￿).  
8 As noted previously, this analysis does not take into consideration ‘soft’ factors obtained through personal 
interactions, informal reports, and candidate interviews. While this is a limitation, career backgrounds nonethe-
less convey a great deal of information on the professional networks, skills, and orientations of EPB heads. 
9 For an example of international media attention, see Watts, J. and Rameesh, R, “Fighting for air: frontline of 
war  on  global  warming”,  The  Guardian,  26  March  2007,  available  at 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/environment/2007/mar/26/globalwarming.china#article_continue 
10 Interview, July 2010, Shanxi EPB Head 
11 Interview, July 2010, government official at the Shanxi EPB  
12 Interview, September 2010, government officials at the Inner Mongolia Provincial Government and Economic 
Comission  
13 Different candidates in some cases also might share a similar career background.  This study only compared 
career backgrounds of EPB leaders appointed (the ‘successful’ candidate). Data on alternative candidates con-
sidered (the ‘unsuccessful’ competitors) were not available.  